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Introduction

In 2010, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) directed its Working Group HI "to undertake work in the field of online
dispute resolution relating to cross-border electronic commerce transactions, including business-to-business and business-to-consumer transactions."' The negotiations have produced a so-far incomplete draft set of procedural rules for
t
Ronald A. Brand is a Chancellor Mark A. Nordenberg University Professor and Director of the
Center for International Legal Education at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law. The author has
attended the sessions of UNCITRAL Working Group III on online dispute resolution as a member of the
Center for International Legal Education (CILE) delegation, invited by the UNCITRAL Secretariat as
expert advisers, as well as meetings of the U.S. Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Private
International Law Working Group on Online Dispute Resolution. The author thanks Dr. Cristina Mariottini for her substantial advice and input in writing this paper. The opinions expressed in this paper are
those of the author and do not represent the positions of any state, organization, or other person.
I Report of the 43rd Session of UNCITRAL (June 21 -July 9, 2010), U.N. Doc. A/65/17, 1 257. Rep.
of UNCITRAL, 43d Sess., Jun. 21, 2009-July 9, 2010, 257, U.N. Doc. A/65/17; GAOR, 65th Sess.,
Supp. No. 17 (2010) [hereinafter Rep. of the 43d Sess.].
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online dispute resolution (ODR) in low-value high-volume electronic transactions. 2 It is anticipated that three other documents will be prepared-addressing
substantive principles to be applied in ODR, guidelines and minimum requirements for ODR providers and neutrals, and a cross-border mechanism for enforcement of the resulting ODR decisions on a global basis. 3
The most difficult issues in the ODR negotiations are centered on concepts
raising important questions about the coordination of the ODR process with national rules of private international law (conflict of laws), national rules of consumer protection, and the international arbitration law framework. If any global
system of ODR is to be successful, it must avoid difficult questions about the
application of national mandatory rules of law, it must be considered to provide
fair procedures and results for consumers, and the results obtained must be enforceable across borders. This will only happen if the system respects the ability
of individual parties (regardless of category) to enter into binding ODR agreements at the time they form the basic contract for an online transaction.
Another key to the success of the ODR negotiations lies in the need for simplicity. In directing Working Group III to engage in the ODR project, UNCITRAL specifically acknowledged that "traditional judicial mechanisms for legal
recourse [do] not offer an adequate solution for cross-border e-commerce disputes," in "small-value, high-volume business-to-business and business-to-consumer disputes."4 Making national courts available for a dispute that involves,
for example, an $80 pair of shoes purchased online in a cross-border transaction,
simply does not serve as an adequate path to an effective remedy. Even if a local
court can handle such a case in a manner that can justify the time and cost,
obtaining recognition and enforcement in the judgment debtor's home state will
remove the effort from any realm of practicality. The same is true for many
larger transactions as well. Even preferential access to courts does not provide a
feasible path to an effective remedy in low-value high-volume cross-border
transactions.
2 This paper is current to August 2012, when it was written. The documents produced by and for the
Working Group may be found at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/commission/working--groups/30nlineDisputeResolution.html.
3 Report of Working Group III (Online Dispute Resolution) on the work of its twenty-third session
(New York, 23-27 May 2011), 52, U.N. Doc. AICN.9/721 (June 3, 2011). This Report explains the
broad support, in 1 52, for a proposal to replace the current wording of 4 of Article I of the Draft
Procedural Rules with the following:
The Rules are intended for use in conjunction with an online dispute resolution framework that
consists of the following documents which are attached to these Rules as Annexes and form part
of these Rules:
(a) Substantive legal principles for deciding cases;
(b) Guidelines for ODR providers and arbitrators;
(c) Minimum requirements for ODR providers and arbitrators, including common communication standards and formats and also including accreditation and quality control; and
(d) Cross-border enforcement mechanism.
Id. This proposed collection of instruments was carried forward in the November 2011 Working Group
Session draft for the preamble of the draft procedural rules. See Note by the Secretariat, Online Dispute
Resolution for Cross-Border Electronic Commerce Transactions: Draft Procedural Rules, 8, U.N. Doc.
A/CNIWG.Ill/WP.112 (Feb. 28, 2012).
4 Rep. of the 43d Sess., supra note 1, 257.
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Simply stated, for consumers in such transactions, access to courts is not access to justice. An ODR system that is simple, efficient, effective, transparent,
and fair offers the hope of real justice in such disputes. What is not yet clear is
whether such a system can be created given existing national laws that restrict
access to dispute resolution outside of the courts.
Creating a global system of ODR that is simple, efficient, effective, transparent, and fair, is not an easy task. The UNCITRAL negotiations have so far indicated, however, that states may be ready to engage in the effort and that there
may be a path to workable results. That path will be closed off, however, if the
resulting system requires reference to multiple national laws on matters such as
consumer protection, applicable law, and arbitration limitations. The UNCITRAL ODR system must be built in a manner that results in a self-contained
system that can and will operate efficiently and effectively. 5
In this article I begin with a brief review of the history of current international
efforts at constructing an acceptable system of ODR for low-value high-volume
transactions. 6 I then consider the important role of party autonomy in the success
of any resulting ODR system.7 If either the ODR system or national legislation
prevents parties from having the autonomy to opt into the resulting system, there
can be no successful result. Party autonomy is key to the difficult issues of consumer protection, applicable law, and enforcement within the existing international litigation and arbitration regimes. It simply makes no sense to design a
system states agree is fair to all and then, through rules that require reference to
national or regional laws, prevent the use of that system. I conclude with some
thoughts on how the UNCITRAL negotiations might best continue on the path to
an ODR system that can revolutionize dispute resolution by creating real benefits
for all participants (particularly for consumers) where little or no practical relief
now exists. 8
II. The History of the UNCITRAL Negotiations
In the summer of 2009, the United States proposed that the UNCITRAL Secretariat "be asked to prepare . . . a study on possible future work that UNCITRAL
5 While the United States has used the credit card charge-back system to provide buyers with a high
level of protection in online transactions, including consumer transactions, that system is both limited and
less than perfect. See, e.g., Gail Hillebrand, Before the GrandRethinking: Five Things to do Today with
Payments Law and Ten Principlesto Guide New Payments Products and New Payments Law, 83 Cin.-

KEwr L. Rev. 769 (2008) (focusing on the need for protection beyond the credit card context, including
in debit card and mobile payment systems).
It does not help buyers who do not have credit cards or wish to use other payment mechanisms. Nor
is it as easily applicable in cross-border transactions on a global scale. Thus, any effort to close off the
development of a comprehensive system of improved dispute settlement in the online environment may
well have the effect of preventing consumer access to adequate remedies in the future. Joining a system
that would "dumb-down" protections already available in the United States would, of course, be a mistake. But it would also be a mistake to refuse to work cooperatively toward a system that can spread
some of the benefits of U.S. domestic consumer protection across the globe.
6 Infra Part II.
7 Infra Part Ill.
8 Infra Part V.
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might engage in on the subject of online dispute resolution in cross-border ecommerce transactions." 9 The Secretariat did prepare such a study,10 and, at its
Sixty-Fifth Session in June and July 2010, "the Commission agreed that a working group should be established to undertake work in the field of online dispute
resolution relating to cross-border e-commerce transactions, including businessto-business and business-to-consumer transactions."II
Working Group III of UNCITRAL was assigned the ODR project, meeting
first on December 13-17, 2010 in Vienna.12 The discussion in Vienna focused on
many issues, including the importance of cross-border ODR to consumers.' 3 "It
was pointed out that, at present in the case of most cross-border consumer transactions, consumers had, in practice, no rights and so the creation of an ODR
standard could have the effect of creating such rights."l 4 Issues discussed included the type of proceedings that might be available in ODR, whether there
was need for binding dispute resolution, whether neutrals could correspond directly with separate parties, the need for confidentiality and data protection, how
the ODR proceedings would fit with existing international rules for commercial
arbitration, and concerns about applicable law, language, and costs of proceedings. Among other things, "[i]t was generally agreed that ODR arbitral decisions
should be final and binding, with no appeals on the substance of the dispute, and
carried out within a short time period after being rendered, and that further consideration of enforcement issues should be deferred until after issues of substantive and procedural rules had been addressed."' 5 The Working Group requested
that the UNCITRAL Secretariat,
(a) Draft generic procedural rules for ODR, including taking into account:
the types of claims with which ODR would deal (B2B and B2C crossborder low-value, high-volume transactions); initiation of the online procedure; alerting parties to any agreement with regard to dispute settlement
that might be entered into at the time of contracting; stages in the dispute
settlement process - including negotiation, conciliation and arbitration;
describing substantive legal principles, including equitable principles, for
deciding cases and making awards; addressing procedural matters such as
representation and language of proceedings; the application of the New
York Convention, as discussed; reference to rules of other ODR systems;
setting out options, where appropriate.16
9 Possible future work on electronic commerce - Proposal of the United States of America on online
dispute resolution, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/681/Add.2 (June 18, 2009).
10 Possible future work on online dispute resolution in cross-border electronic commerce transactions, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/706 (Apr. 23, 2010).
11 Rep. of the 43d Sess., supra note 1, 257.
12 Report of Working Group III (Online Dispute Resolution) on the work of its twenty-second session (Vienna, 13-17 Dec. 2010), U.N. Doc. AICN.9/716 (Jan. 17, 2011).
13 Id.
"4

42.

Id.

15 Id. 1 99.
16 Id. 115.
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The Working Group met a second time on May 23-27, 2011 in New York,17
where it considered the set of Draft Procedural Rules that had been prepared by
the Secretariat.' 8 Those rules focused on an initial negotiation phase, followed
by facilitated settlement, and then binding arbitration.' 9 The Working Group further discussed whether the second and third phases were to be separate or related. 2 0 At the end of the session, the Working Group requested that the
Secretariat prepare a new working draft of the procedural rules, "taking into account the views expressed by the Working Group at the current session," 2 1 and
further requested that the Secretariat prepare documentation for its next session
addressing:
(a) Guidelines for neutrals;
(b) Minimum standards for ODR providers;
(c) Substantive legal principles for resolving disputes; and
(d) A cross-border enforcement mechanism. 22
The third session of negotiations was held on November 14-18, 2011 in Vienna. 2 3 Work continued to focus on a detailed review of the draft procedural
rules.24 The session again wrestled with details of process, as well as issues of
consumer protection, coordination with existing UNCITRAL arbitration instruments, and the enforceability of results, with the hope expressed "that the generic
procedural rules for ODR could be adopted on a provisional basis at the next
Commission session" scheduled for summer 2012.25
While there was hope that the progress made in November 2011 could lead to
provisional adoption of the procedural rules at the fourth Working Group session
in New York on May 21-25, 2012, for consideration by the Commission at its
June-July 2012 meeting, that did not occur. The May session covered a review
of the procedural rules dealing with introductory rules, commencement of ODR,
negotiation, appointment and authority of neutrals, the relationship between facilitated settlement and arbitration, and the impact of the Working Group deliberations on consumer protection. 2 6
17 Report of Working Group III (Online Dispute Resolution) on the work of its twenty-third session
(New York, 23-27 May 2011), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/721 (June 3, 2011) [hereinafter Rep. of WGIII 23d
Sess.].
18 Note by the Secretariat, Online Dispute Resolution for Cross-Border Electronic Commerce Transactions: Draft Procedural Rules, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.107 (Mar. 17, 2011).
19 Id.

20 Id. 7.
21 Rep. of WGIII 23d Sess., supra note 17, T 141.
22 Id. 140.
23 Report of Working Group III (Online Dispute Resolution) on the work of its twenty-fourth session
(Vienna, 14-18 Nov. 2011), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/739 (Nov. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Rep. of WGIII 24d
Sess.].
24 Note by the Secretariat, Online Dispute Resolution for Cross-Border Electronic Commerce Transactions: Draft Procedural Rules, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.Ill/WP.109 (Sept. 27, 2011).
25 Rep. of WGIII 24d Sess., supra note 23, 14.
26 Report of Working Group III (Online Dispute Resolution) on the work of its twenty-fifth session
(New York, 21-25 May 2012), U.N. Doc. AICN.9/744 (June 7, 2012).
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As this article is written in late summer 2012, the next Working Group III
session is scheduled for November 5-9, 2012, in Vienna. If no final set of procedural rules is completed at that meeting, it may well be time to declare the process at a standstill. If that happens, it still may not signal the end of the
development of a global ODR process. Because all of the instruments being
considered in Working Group III are soft law instruments, and no treaty is proposed, it remains possible for the private sector to undertake and implement
much of the same work. This may well be one of those instances where the
market will move forward when governments fail to do so.
III. Key Issues as the Negotiations Continue
A. The Fundamental Role of Party Autonomy and the Need to Ensure it in
the UNCITRAL ODR System
Because the documents being created by Working Group III are not treaties,
but are all soft law instruments, they cannot create default rules that will apply
absent party consent. This means that the system created by those instruments
will work only if parties have the autonomy to opt into the ODR system. This
makes good sense in a global framework in which national rules may differ significantly. If the system is to work effectively, it must work through the consent
of the parties and free of national law restrictions that would make it operate
differently depending on where the parties are from. Merchants simply will not
participate in a dispute resolution system that differs for each buyer based on the
laws of that buyer's home state. The added cost of such a system will result in
merchants opting out, with the net result being that consumers and other buyers
will have decreased access to goods and services and will pay higher prices for
those goods and services that are sold cross-border. 2 7
27 See European Commission Staff, Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the proposal for a directive on consumer rights Impact Assessment Report, available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/docs/impact-assessment-report-en.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2012). This has been
demonstrated in Europe, where cross-border intemet transactions have actually declined as a result of the
regulatory barrier to operating on a pan-EU basis posed by fragmented national laws, including consumer
protection laws, through the conflict of laws rules in the Rome I Regulation. The Commission Staff
Working Document describes the empirical effect as follows:
The cross-border potential of distance selling is not fully exploited by consumers, who could
take more advantage of the considerable price differences between the Member States (see below). Cross-border Internet purchases were made by only 6% of consumers surveyed in 2005 (up
from 3% in 2003). This compares with the 23% who bought goods or services via the Internet
from domestic sellers. The scale of cross-border purchases, as well as its significance compared
with domestic shopping is even lower for contracts concluded via phone or post (mail order).
This trend is confirmed in 2008-while the number of consumers having used distance sales
methods for domestic purchases has increased for all distance sales methods compared to 2005,
this number has remained flat for cross-border distance purchases. This discrepancy between
trends in cross-border and domestic sales is particularly significant for Internet sales. While the
number of consumers using the Internet for domestic purchases increased by 7 percentage points
in 2005-2008, from 23% to 30%, this increase was only I percentage point over the same period
for cross-border Internet purchases, from 6% to 7%.
Id. at 9. The same document concludes that cross-border internet commerce problems are a result of
fragmented Member State laws that are applicable through Community Regulations:
The effects of the fragmentation are felt by business because of the conflict-of law rules, and in
particular the Rome I Regulation ("Rome I"), which obliges traders not to go below the level of
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This necessary focus on party autonomy at the core of the ODR system requires
that national legal systems must accept private party ability to agree to ODR on a
pre-dispute basis. Thus, it is useful at the outset to understand the extent to
which national and regional legal systems currently respect or limit party autonomy to enter into dispute resolution alternatives. While a survey of all national
legal system rules in this regard is beyond the scope of this exercise, the laws of
the U.S. and EU serve as examples of approaches that must be reconciled with
the final UNCITRAL ODR product.
An initial question is whether the UNCITRAL system will distinguish among
different types of transactions for purposes of access to and application of the
ODR procedures and rules. Private international law rules in many countries do
rely on such distinctions, with special rules for what are determined to be weaker
parties. Thus, both the Brussels I and Rome I Regulations of the European Union
create special rules for consumer transactions, individual agreements of employment, and insurance contracts.2 8
If different types of parties are subject to different sets of rules in the ODR
system, then there must first be definitions created that are capable of use in
distinguishing which category a party falls within, someone must be designated
to apply that definition, and procedures must exist for determining when and how
that someone applies the applicable definition. All of this runs counter to the
goals of simplicity, effectiveness, and efficiency. While it has been suggested
that consumers should be subject to special rules in the ODR system, implementing such rules would ensure the failure of the UNCITRAL project. The cost-in
both time and financial resources-of determining in each case whether one
party is a consumer, would be prohibitive. Additionally, there is no reason to
believe it would serve any useful purpose. If the system can be created to be
transparent, effective, and fair to all parties, there is no need for special treatment
based on whether one party is a consumer. This is demonstrated further in the
discussion, below, of prohibitions on pre-dispute arbitration agreements.
The negotiations in Working Group III have recognized the need to avoid
distinguishing special classes of parties in the ODR process from the outset, with
the original Commission charge to the Working Group providing a mandate "to
undertake work in the field of online dispute resolution relating to cross-border
electronic commerce transactions, including business-to-business and businessto-consumer transactions." 2 9 So far at least, the Working Group has not deviated
from this charge. No special categories or party-based limitations on scope have
been created in the draft procedural rules.
protection afforded to foreign consumers in their country. As a result of the fragmentation and
Rome I, a trader wishing to sell cross-border into another Member State will have to incur legal
and other compliance costs to make sure that he is respecting the level of consumer protection in
the country of destination. These costs reduce the incentive for businesses to sell cross-border,
particularly to consumers in small Member States. Such costs are eventually passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices or, worse, businesses refuse to sell cross-border. In both
cases consumer welfare is below the optimum level.
Id. at 8.
28 Infra Parts III.B.3, I1I.B.4.
29 Rep. of the 43d Sess., supra note 1, 257.

Volume 10, Issue I

Loyola University Chicago International Law Review

17

Party Autonomy and Access to Justice
B. Private International Law, Party Autonomy, and Consumer Protection in
the United States and the European Union
Even without distinctions for consumers (or any other class of "weaker"
party), legal systems take differing approaches to the general question of party
autonomy. As already noted, the U.S. and EU approaches provide useful examples of the types of systems that must be reconciled in creating a global ODR
system. Thus, it is worth considering those systems at this juncture.
1.

U.S. Law on Choice of Forum

The latter half of the twentieth century saw a dismantling of prior restrictions
on the exercise of party autonomy, allowing international trade to flourish on
terms chosen by the parties. While the late Professor Peter Nygh's statement that
"freedom of contract is an essential part of the market economy," and that "[n]o
State can hope effectively to control international contracts," 30 may tend to overstate the case, most legal systems have moved to a twenty-first century world in
which parties-particularly in international transactions-have significant freedom to select both the forum in which their disputes will be settled and the law to
be applied by the chosen tribunal. 3 1 While arbitration represents a special category, with its own international legal regime, 32 the movement toward respect for
party autonomy has encompassed both choice of court and arbitration.3 3
In the United States, three Supreme Court decisions demonstrate the march to
respect for party autonomy in choice of forum. In 1972, in Bremen v. Zapata, the
Court enforced a choice of forum clause between U.S. and Italian parties choosing a London court for a large commercial transaction. 34 In 1985, the Court
honored the Federal Arbitration Act and New York Convention as demonstrating
a strong policy in favor of arbitration in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, enforcing an agreement to arbitrate U.S. antitrust issues in
Japan.35 And in 1991, in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,36 the Court enforced a small print choice of forum clause on the back of a consumer cruise
ticket, even though the consumer likely had never read the clause and certainly
30 PFTTER NYGH, AUTONOMY IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRAcrs 2 (1999).

31 See infra notes 39-71 and accompanying text.
32 See generally United Nations Conference on International and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, July 6, 1988, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/XXIII1e.pdf (explaining the
core of the international arbitration regime is the 1958 United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention), which entered into force for
the United States on December 29, 1970).
33 See generally NYGH, supra note 30 (discussing further the development of party autonomy); see
also Ronald A. Brand, The Rome I Regulation Rules on Party Autonomy for Choice of Law: A U.S.
Perspective,THE ROME I REGULATION ON THF LAW APPLICABLE TO CONTRACrUAL OBLIGATIONS (Univ.

of Pittsburgh Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2011-29, 2011),
availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1973162.
34 M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15-19 (1972).
35 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
36 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 972 (1991).
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had not participated in negotiating its terms. These cases are the core of a strong
policy favoring the ability of parties, in all types of transactions, to choose the
forum (whether in litigation or arbitration) in which their disputes are to be
settled.
2.

U.S. Law on Choice of Law
The Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws clearly provides for party auton-

omy on choice of law. In section 186, it states that "[i]ssues in contract are
determined by the law chosen by the parties," so long as that choice is consistent
with sections 187 and 188.37 Section 187 then provides that "[t]he law of the
state chosen by the parties . . . will be applied if the particular issue is one which

the parties could have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue." 38 Subsection (2) of section 187 goes further by providing
that the parties' choice of law will govern, even when the issue is not one for
which the parties could have written an explicit provision into their contract,
unless either (a) there exists neither a "substantial relationship" between the parties, or their transaction, and the chosen state, nor another "reasonable basis" for
their choice of law, or (b) application of the chosen law "would be contrary to a
fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest" in the dispute, and which would have been the applicable law under section 188 in the
absence of an effective party choice. 39
Like the Restatement, the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) begins with a
statement of respect for party autonomy, followed by limitations. The original
UCC of 1956 contained section 1-105, which provided:
When a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this state and also to
another state or nation, parties may agree that the law of either this state
or of such other state or nation shall govern their rights and duties. Failing such agreement, this Act applies to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this state. 40
When Article I of the UCC was revised in 2001, this rule was replaced with a
new section 1-301, which split the rule, providing complete freedom for choice
of law in merchant-to-merchant contracts (deleting the "reasonable relation" requirement) and setting forth specific, expanded limitations on choice of law in
consumer contracts. 4 1 The general rule of this provision was contained in paragraph (b), which read:
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this section:
(1) an agreement by parties to a domestic transaction that any or all of
their rights and obligations are to be determined by the law of this
37

RiSTATEMENT (SHcoN))

OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 186 ch. 8, topic 1, applicable law (1971).

38 Id. § 187(1).
39 Id. § 187(2)(A)-(13).
40 U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (1956).
41 U.C.C. § 1-301 (2001).
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State or of another State is effective, whether or not the transaction
bears a relation to the State designated; and
(2) an agreement by parties to an international transaction that any or
all of their rights and obligations are to be determined by the law of
this State or of another State or country is effective, whether or not
the transaction bears a relation to the State or country designated. 42
In paragraph (e), this rule of party autonomy became subject to a public policy
limitation:
(e) An agreement otherwise effective under subsection (b) is not effective
to the extent that application of the law of the State or country designated
would be contrary to a fundamental policy of the State or country whose
law would govern in the absence of agreement under subsection (c).43
This 2001 UCC provision did not contain any general reference to mandatory
rules-except to the extent those mandatory rules would rise to the level of public policy. 44 It did, however, contain a separate rule for consumer contracts that
incorporated concepts of mandatory rules and followed the European model
found in the Rome I Convention (now found in the Rome I Regulation). 45 Paragraph (d) of section 1-301 allowed a consumer to enter into a valid choice of law
clause when the transaction bore a "reasonable relation" to the forum state, but
would retain any mandatory rule protections of both the consumer's state of habitual residence and, in sale of goods contracts, the state of performance. 46
The first thirty-three states to enact the revised Article I all declined to adopt
the new section 1-301, and instead retained the substance of former section 1105.47 As a result of this clear rejection of the "uniform" rule, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute (ALI) amended the Official Text of section 1-301 in 2008 to revert
substantially to the language of the former section 1-105, which had remained the
de facto uniform rule.4 8
Id. § 1-301(c).
43 Id. § 1-301(f).
44 Id.
42

45
46

See infra Part Ill.B.4 (discussing Rome I Regulation).
U.C.C. § 1-301(d) (2001).

47 See The American Law Institute, 85th Annual Meeting Program, 8-9 (2008), available at http://
www.ali.org/-meetings/Program2008.pdf (the Virgin Islands was the only jurisdiction to enact the revised § 1-301); see also Keith A. Rowley, The Often Imitated, But (Still) Not Yet Duplicated, Revised
UCC Article 1, NEV. L.J. 1, 19 (2011), available at http://www.law.unlv.edu/faculty/rowley/RAl.
08151 l.pdf. The Virgin Islands was the only jurisdiction to enact the revised § 1-301.
48 The American Law Institute, 85th Annual Meeting Program, supra note 47, annex 1; see also
U.C.C. § 1-301(a)-(c) (Proposed Official Draft 2008).
§ 1-301. Territorial Applicability; Parties' Power to Choose Applicable Law
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, when a transaction bears a reasonable relation to
this state and also to another state or nation the parties may agree that the law either of this state
or of such other state or nation shall govern their rights and duties,
(b) In the absence of an agreement effective under subsection (a), and except as provided in
subsection (c), [the Uniform Commercial Code] applies to transactions bearing an appropriate
relation to this state,
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3.

EU Law on Choice of Forum - The Brussels I Regulation

The system now developed within the European Union provides a civil law
comparison with U.S. jurisdiction rules. That system is now codified in a Community Regulation commonly referred to as the Brussels I Regulation. 4 9 The
jurisdictional rules found in Chapter II of the Brussels I Regulation begin with
the rule of general jurisdiction found in Article 2: "persons domiciled in a Member State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member
State."50 This is the foundation of jurisdiction under the Brussels system. The
important personal nexus is domicile; a defendant may be sued in his state of
domicile on any claim, no matter where that claim arose. 5 '
While the general jurisdiction rule is found in Article 2, at the beginning of the
Brussels Regulation, the hierarchy of jurisdictional rules cannot be understood by
moving easily through the Convention. Rules found early in the Convention often
can be trumped by rules occurring at a later point in the text. The general hierarchical structure of the convention is as follows:
1) Article 22 provides for exclusive jurisdiction in certain types of cases,
usually dealing with property rights that are territorial in nature and
creating jurisdiction in the state in which the property is located or
created. If such exclusive jurisdiction exists, then no other rule need
be consulted.
2) Articles 8-21 provide special rules designed to protect the party considered to be at a negotiation disadvantage in insurance (Arts. 8-14),
consumer (Arts. 15-17), and employment (Arts. 18-21) contracts.
These rules generally allow the "weaker" party to sue in its home
court, and prohibit pre-dispute choice of court agreements.
3) Article 23 provides respect for party autonomy (except in insurance,
consumer, and employment contracts) by stating that, when one or
more of the parties is domiciled in a Member State, the court chosen
by agreement of the parties shall have exclusive jurisdiction.

4) As noted above, if neither the exclusive jurisdiction rules of Article
22, nor the choice of court ("prorogation") rule of Article 23 applies,
and the matter does not involve an insurance, consumer, or employment contract, then jurisdiction always exists under Article 2 in the
courts of the state of domicile of the defendant.
5) Articles 5 through 7 then provide "special jurisdiction" rules that allow suit to be brought in a forum other than that of the defendant's
state of domicile. Article 6 deals with jurisdiction over multiple defendants, and requires jurisdiction under another provision as to at
(c) [listing UCC provisions from which derogation is not allowed].
Id.
49 See generallyCouncil Regulation 44/2001, of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2000 O.J. (L012) 1-23 (EC)
(amending Annex I and Annex 11) [hereinafter Brussels I Regulation].
50 Id. art. 2(1), § 1, ch. 11.
51 Id.
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least one defendant. Article 7 is limited to jurisdiction over claims
involving the use or operation of a ship. This makes Article 5 the
most important source of special jurisdiction rules that allow a measure of forum shopping. Article 5 provides rules for specific types of
cases, with the most important being contract cases (Art. 5(1)) and tort
cases (Art. 5(3)).52

In a discussion of party autonomy, Article 23 is the relevant provision, and
provides for significant freedom in choice of forum:
If the parties, one or more of whom is domiciled in a Member State, have
agreed that a court or the courts of a Member State are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have arisen or which may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, that court or those courts shall
have jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive unless the parties
have agreed otherwise. 5 3
The Brussels I Regulation provides special rules for consumers in provisions
that include Articles 16 and 17.54 Article 16 provides that a consumer "may
bring proceedings against the other party to a contract either in the courts of the
Member State in which that party is domiciled or in the courts for the place
where the consumer is domiciled," and that "[p]roceedings may be brought
against a consumer by the other party to the contract only in the courts of the
Member State in which the consumer is domiciled."55 Article 17 prohibits predispute choice of court agreements in consumer contracts, allowing a choice of
court agreement only if it is "entered into after the dispute has arisen," unless it
"allows the consumer to bring proceedings in courts other than those indicated in
this Section," or if the consumer and the other party are both "at the time of
conclusion of the contract domiciled or habitually resident in the same Member
State, and [the agreement] confers jurisdiction on the courts of that Member
State." 56 Thus, consumers get the advantage of their home court as plaintiffs and
as defendants. In prohibiting pre-dispute choice of court agreements in consumer
contracts, Article 17 allows no discretion in determining whether a chosen court
is good or bad, it is simply prohibited.5 7
4.

EU Law on Choice of Law - The Rome I Regulation

The Rome I Regulation on law applicable to contractual obligations begins the
party autonomy analysis with the same basic rule found in the Second Restate52 Brussels I Regulation, supra note 49, art. 5(1)-(3),

§ 2.

53 Id. art. 23(1) § 7.
54 Id. arts. 16-17 § 3.
55 Id. art. 16(2) § 3.
56 Id. art. 17(3) § 3.
57 Id.
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ment that is applied in the U.S. 5 8 The core rule is found in Article 3, titled "Freedom of Contract," and states clearly that parties' chosen law governs a contract. 59
There are, however, numerous limitations on party autonomy within the Rome I
Regulation. The Article 3 rule allowing party autonomy is accompanied by limitations found in Articles 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, and 21 and further elaboration of
these limitations is provided in many of the 46 recitals preceding the Regulation
text. 60
The general structure of Articles 3 and 9 of the Rome I Regulation provide
public policy limitations on party autonomy through the application of mandatory
rules, with Articles 5, 6, 7, and 8 carving out specific exceptions to party autonomy based on categories of protected persons. 6' Article 6 creates special rules
for consumer contracts. 62 In paragraph 1, it creates a presumption that the law of
the country where the consumer has his habitual residence will govern a consumer contract, so long as the professional:
(a) pursues his commercial or professional activities in the country where
the consumer has his habitual residence, or
(b) by any means, directs such activities to that country or to several
countries including that country, and the contract falls within the scope of
such activities. 63
Paragraph 2 follows by permitting a choice of law clause in a consumer contract, but providing that the clause "may not . . . have the result of depriving the

consumer of the protection afforded to him by provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement by virtue of the law which, in the absence of choice,
would have been applicable on the basis of paragraph 1." The result is a rather
interesting conundrum for the "professional" in the consumer contract relationship. If there is no choice of law clause in the contract, the consumer will get the
benefit of the provisions of law designed to protect consumers that are in effect in
the country of the consumer's habitual residence. If a choice of law clause is
inserted in the contract, then the consumer will get the benefit of the provisions
of law designed to protect consumers that are in effect in both the country of the
consumer's habitual residence and the country whose law is chosen in the clause.
This creates a clear incentive for a merchant or professional not to place a choice
of law clause in a consumer contract.

58 See generally Council Regulation 593/2008, of 17 June 2008 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6-16 (EC) [hereinafter Rome I Regulation].
59 Id. art. 3(l), ch. 11.
60 Id. Some might also consider the Rome I rules on consent and material validity (art. 10), formal
validity (art. I1), and incapacity (art. 13), to present limits on party autonomy.
61 Rome I Regulation, supra note 58, arts. 3-9.
62 Id. art. 6.
63 Id. art 6(l) (a)-(b).
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5. Other Consumer Protection Rules in the European Union: The Consumer
Protection Directive, the Proposed ODR Regulation and the Proposed
ADR Directive
The Brussels I and Rome I Regulations deal primarily with matters in the
courts of the Member States of the European Union. The party autonomy rules
of the Brussels I Regulation apply only to choice of court agreements, and not to
arbitration agreements.64 There is another instrument, however, that deals with
arbitration agreements, albeit in a tangential manner. That instrument is Council
Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts.6 5
Unlike EU Regulations, which have direct effect in Member States, EU Directives are to be implemented by Member State legislation. 66 The consumer contracts directive does not have blanket rules on choice of forum or choice of law.
It is designed to promote legislation that prohibits unfair terms in consumer contracts. Articles 2, 3, and 6 contribute to this process with the following language:
Article 2
For the purposes of this Directive:
(a) 'unfair terms' means the contractual terms defined in Article 3;
(b) 'consumer' means any natural person who, in contracts covered by
this Directive, is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business or profession;
(c) 'seller or supplier' means any natural or legal person who, in contracts covered by this Directive, is acting for purposes relating to his
trade, business or profession, whether publicly owned or privately
owned.
Article 3
1. A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated
shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith,
it causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations
arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer.
2. A term shall always be regarded as not individually negotiated
where it has been drafted in advance and the consumer has therefore
not been able to influence the substance of the term, particularly in the
context of a pre-formulated standard contract.
The fact that certain aspects of a term or one specific term have been
individually negotiated shall not exclude the application of this Article
to the rest of a contract if an overall assessment of the contract indicates that it is nevertheless a pre-formulated standard contract.
6 See generally Brussels I Regulation, supra note 48.

65 Council Directive 93/13/EEC, of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, 1993 O.J.
(L 095) 29-34 (EC) [hereinafter Consumer Protection Directive].
66 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 288 (ex art. 249
TEC), Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 157-58 [hereinafter TFEU].
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Where any seller or supplier claims that a standard term has been individually negotiated, the burden of proof in this respect shall be incumbent on him.
3. The Annex shall contain an indicative and non-exhaustive list of
the terms which may be regarded as unfair.
Article 6
1. Member States shall lay down that unfair terms used in a contract
concluded with a consumer by a seller or supplier shall, as provided
for under their national law, not be binding on the consumer and that
the contract shall continue to bind the parties upon those terms if it is
capable of continuing in existence without the unfair terms.
2. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the
consumer does not lose the protection granted by this Directive by virtue of the choice of the law of a non-Member country as the law applicable to the contract if the latter has a close connection with the
territory of the Member States.6 7
Most notably, the Annex includes the following language about arbitration agreements in consumer contracts:
TERMS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 3 (3) 1. Terms which have the
object or effect of: ....
(q) excluding or hindering the consumer's right to take legal action or
exercise any other legal remedy, particularly by requiring the consumer to
take disputes exclusively to arbitration not covered by legal provisions,
unduly restricting the evidence available to him or imposing on him a
burden of proof which, according to the applicable law, should lie with
another party to the contract. 68
Two cases interpreting this provision are of particular interest. In the 2006
Mostaza Claro case, 69 the European Court of Justice interpreted Article 6(1) of
Directive 93/13 as a mandatory provision designed to re-establish equality between weaker consumers and stronger merchants. 70 Thus, "a national court
seised of an action for annulment of an arbitration award must determine whether
the arbitration agreement is void and annul that award where that agreement contains an unfair term, even though the consumer has not pleaded that invalidity in
the course of the arbitration proceedings, but only in that of the action for
annulment." 7'

67 Consumer Protection Directive, supra note 65, arts. 2, 3, 6.
68 Consumer Protection Directive, supra note 65, Annex.
69 Case C-168/05, Mostaza Claro v. Centro M6vil Milenium SL, 2006 E.C.R. 1-10421.
70 Id. f 36.
71 Id.

39.
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Mostaza Claro was followed in 2009 by the Asturcom Telecomunicaciones
case, 7 2 in which the Court of Justice stated that Article 6 of the Consumer Protection Directive had equal standing with national rules of public policy. 7 3 Thus,

It follows from this that, inasmuch as the national court or tribunal seised
of an action for enforcement of a final arbitration award is required, in
accordance with domestic rules of procedure, to assess of its own motion
whether an arbitration clause is in conflict with domestic rules of public
policy, it is also obliged to assess of its own motion whether that clause is
unfair in the light of Article 6 of that directive, where it has available to it
the legal and factual elements necessary for that task.7 4
The hostility toward pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer contracts is
apparent in Member State implementation of Directive 93/13.75
The provisions set out in Directive 93/13 were mirrored in the Commission's
proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on consumer
rights. 7 6 Chapter V of the proposed Directive broadly reflected the provisions of
Directive 93/13 and Annex 11(c) mirrored Annex I(q) of Directive 93/13-but
with an important distinction. While Annex I of Directive 93/13 referred to
72

Case C-40/08, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL v. Rodriguez Nogueira, 2009 E.C.R. 1-09579.

1 52.
74 Id. [ 53.
75 Id. In England, for example, an arbitration agreement is automatically unfair if it relates to a claim
for a pecuniary remedy which does not exceed 5,000 GBP. Furthermore, even when the claim exceeds
such a financial limit, compulsory arbitration in B2C contracts will generally be unenforceable by virtue
of the 1999 Regulations implementing the Directive if they have the effect of excluding or hindering the
consumer's right to take legal statutory action. Nevertheless, there are two situations under which an
arbitration agreement is not regarded as "unfair":
(i). if the agreement has been individually negotiated; (ii). if the arbitration clause provides for
voluntary or non-binding arbitration.
The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, 1999, S.I. 1999/2083, § 5
(U.K.).
In Germany and Austria the validity of the provisions is recognized only if the provisions are recorded in a separate arbitration agreement signed by the consumer. ZIVILPROZESSORDUNG [ZPO] [CoDE
OF CIvIL PROCIDUR], Jan. 30, 1877, as amended, § 1031, para. 5 (Ger.); ZIVILPROZESSORDUNG [ZPO]
[CiviL PROCEDURE STATIu], as amended, art. 617, para. 2, (Austria).
French law historically imposed relatively strict statutory provisions on domestic arbitration clauses
between persons involved in commercial activities and consumers. In 1996, however, the Paris Cour
d'Appel has held that these domestic prohibitions do not apply in the context of international B2C
contracts.
Swedish legislation provides for the invalidity of consumer arbitration agreements as to defined categories of future disputes, together with an express proviso that the exception is inapplicable where contrary to Sweden's international obligations (in particular, the New York Convention). Lag Om
Skiljefdrfarande [SFS] [THE SWEDISH ARDrfRATION Acr OF 1999] 116:1, 6 (Swed.).
As for Italy, the relevant provision used to be Art. 1469-bis and -ter of the Civil Code, whose statutory provision was very similar to the ones provided in the Austrian and German ZPOs. However, Art.
36(2) of the Consumer Code now holds: "Terms shall be void, even if they have been individually
negotiated, where they have the object or effect of: . . . (b) excluding or limiting the actions of the
consumer vis-a-vis the professional or another party in the event of total or partial non-performance or
inadequate performance by the professional." Codice del Consumo 6 settembre 2005, n. 206, art. 36(2)
(It.).
76 Proposalfor a Directive of the European Parliamentand of the Council on Consumer Rights,
COM (2008) 614 final (Oct. 8, 2008).
73 Id.
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"terms which may be regarded as unfair," Annex II of the proposed Directive,
apparently acknowledging the ECJ's opinion in Mostazo Clara, listed contract
terms that "are considered unfair in all circumstances." 7 7 Accordingly, under
Annex 11(c) of the proposed Directive, contract terms which have the object or
the effect of "excluding or hindering the consumer's right to take legal action or
exercise any other legal remedy, particularly by requiring the consumer to take
disputes exclusively to arbitration not covered by legal provisions" would have
been be unfair in all circumstances.78
The Commission's stark changes to Directive 93/13 were not adopted, however. The resulting Directive 2011/83,79 in its Article 32, provides the following
resolution of the issue:
Article 32. Amendment to Directive 93/13/EEC
In Directive 93/13/EEC, the following Article is inserted:
Article 8a
1. Where a Member State adopts provisions in accordance with Article 8, it shall inform the Commission thereof, as well as of any subsequent changes, in particular where those provisions:
- extend the unfairness assessment to individually negotiated contractual terms or to the adequacy of the price or remuneration; or,
- contain lists of contractual terms which shall be considered as
unfair,
2. The Commission shall ensure that the information referred to in
paragraph I is easily accessible to consumers and traders, inter alia, on
a dedicated website.
3. The Commission shall forward the information referred to in paragraph I to the other Member States and the European Parliament. The
Commission shall consult stakeholders on that information.
Thus, the resulting Directive continues the approach in Article 3 of Directive 93/
13, focusing on the unfairness of particular contract term, but allowing each
Member State to determine specific types of terms to be considered to be unfair.
This may lead to Member State implementation of Directive 2011/83 that includes specific prohibition of pre-dispute agreement to arbitration in consumer
contracts.

77
78

Id. art. 34.
Id. Annex 11(c).

79 Council Directive 2011/83/EU, 2011 O.J. (L 304) 22.11.2011. Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive
93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing
Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council.
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IV. Comparing U.S. and EU Approaches in the Context of the
UNCITRAL ODR Negotiations
A.

Comparative Paternalism (Whose Parenting Style is Best?)

In the United States, the law has not developed such a head-on approach to
private international law and other limitations on party autonomy in consumer
contracts as has been the case in the European Union. The same rules that govern choice of law in contracts in general most often will govern choice of law in
consumer contracts.8 0 The failure of the 2001 revised version of UCC § 1-301,
with its paragraph (e) rule on consumer contracts,8 ' to be adopted anywhere but
in the Virgin Islands indicates the difficulty of gaining legislative support for
such a consumer protection rule in the United States. 8 2 In the realm of choice of
forum, the Bremen, Mitsubishi Motors, and Carnival Cruise Lines trilogy of U.S.

Supreme Court decisions underlines the similar deference to party choice of a
dispute resolution forum.83
This does not mean, however, that the U.S. system has no limits on party
autonomy in choice of forum or choice of law. Those limits in choice of law
come in the form of mandatory rules that would apply in the absence of party
agreement on choice of law and in the ultimate imposition of public policy. The
Second Restatement allows only limited derogation from mandatory rules that
would have been applicable in the absence of a choice of law provision and there
is no reference to the substantive content of those rules. 8 4 It does this by beginning with the proposition that the chosen law will govern all matters that could
have been resolved by explicit provision of the contract.85 It then goes on to
provide that the chosen law will also be applied in matters covered by mandatory
laws unless there is no substantial relationship with the chosen state and there is
no other reasonable basis for the choice or if the chosen law would be contrary
"to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest in
determining the particular case." 86
Nor does the rejection in the United States of conflicts rules for the protection
of consumers indicate the lack of a public policy to protect consumers. The
choice has been made, however, to accomplish this purpose outside the context
of rules of private international law. While the law applicable to questions of
s0 See, e.g., America Online, Inc. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699, 710 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)
(rejecting an agreement choosing Virginia law because California law provided greater protection for
consumers).
81 See supra text accompanying note 45. The 2001 version of the UCC § 1-301(e) retained the reasonable relationship requirement for consumer contracts and prevented derogation from mandatory consumer protection rules.
82 See supra text accompanying notes 47-48 (showing the Virgin Islands is the only place that has
adopted the 2001 revised version of UCC § 1-301).
83 See supra text accompanying notes 34-36 (discussing the Bremen, Mitsubishi Motors, and Carnival Cruise Lines cases).

84 Supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
85 CONFicr o LAWS

86 Id.
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jurisdiction can differ substantially from general rules on applicable law, cases in
the United States have continued to provide similar analysis of the two matters
on the issue of party autonomy. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,8 7 while dealing with the question of choice of

forum, is instructive generally on the question of party autonomy.
In Carnival Cruise Lines, the Court held reasonable a small print choice of
court clause on the back of a cruise ticket that required litigation of all disputes in
Florida, even for consumers from the state of Washington.8 8 Justice Blackmun's
opinion for the majority acknowledged that "[c]ommon sense dictates that a
ticket of this kind will be a form contract the terms of which are not subject to
negotiation, and that an individual purchasing the ticket will not have bargaining
parity with the cruise line."89
The difference in bargaining power of the parties was not, however, the only
interest considered by the Court.
Including a reasonable forum clause in a form contract of this kind well
may be permissible for several reasons: first, a cruise line has a special
interest in limiting the fora in which it potentially could be subject to suit.
Because a cruise ship typically carries passengers from many locales, it is
not unlikely that a mishap on a cruise could subject the cruise line to
litigation in several different fora. Additionally, a clause establishing ex
ante the forum for dispute resolution has the salutary effect of dispelling
any confusion about where suits arising from the contract must be
brought and defended, sparing litigants the time and expense of pretrial
motions to determine the correct forum and conserving judicial resources
that otherwise would be devoted to deciding those motions. Finally, it
stands to reason that passengers who purchase tickets containing a forum
clause like that at issue in this case benefit in the form of reduced fares
reflecting the savings that the cruise line enjoys by limiting the fora in
which it may be sued. 90
What is interesting here is the Court's failure to consider any overriding public
policy or mandatory rule that might protect a consumer. In part this may have
been because no such rule existed.9 1 Nonetheless, upholding the merchant-imposed choice of court clause against the consumer was justified on the basis of
(1) the merchant's interest in litigating all similar disputes in a single forum, (2)
joint interests of predictability, and (3) the general (public) interest of all con-

87 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
88 Id. at 594-5.
89 Id. at 593.
90 Id. at 593-4 (citations omitted).

91 The Court did consider the argument that the choice of court clause violated a federal statute
prohibiting waiver of liability clauses in contracts for the carriage of persons, but found the statute was
not applicable. Id. at 595-6.
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sumers of such cruises in the lower price that is assumed to result from upholding
such clauses on the basis of the first two interests. 9 2
Applying the rationale of the Carnival Cruise Lines decision to questions of
party autonomy, and in particular to issues of choice of forum and choice of law,
we can discern two very different approaches to consumer protection. On the
one hand, the use of private international law rules limiting choice of forum and
law are founded on the belief that consumers are best protected if, when a dispute
arises, they have the advantage of dispute settlement in their home courts, applying their home law. This is the approach found in the Brussels I and Rome I
Regulations. It focuses on protection of the interests of those consumers who
ultimately have disputes with the merchant. It does not, however, give due consideration to the interests of all consumers at the contract formation stage of the
transaction. Even the Rapporteurs for the Rome I Regulation considered this a
defect in this particular approach to using private international law for consumer
protection, suggesting that the protection offered by the consumer provisions of
the Rome I Regulation "is largely illusory in view of the small value of most
consumer claims and the cost and time consumed by bringing court proceedings," and recommending "backing up" such rules with more accessible methods
for alternative dispute resolution. 9 3
On the other hand, the U.S. approach views the interests of all similarly situated consumers and begins with the (unstated) question of how the greatest number of consumers can be benefited. The court in Carnival Cruise Lines concluded
that it is reasonable to assume that the general benefit to all similarly situated
consumers of a lower price for the cruise ticket outweighs the detriment to the
individual consumer who develops a dispute with the merchant and is then compelled to take the merchant's choice of law and forum. 94 Thus, the U.S. approach
focused on the contract formation stage and the benefits to all similarly situated
consumers, and gave less attention to the litigation stage interests that are the
core of the European approach.
92 Id. at 593-4. This, of course, assumes that any savings to the merchant will be passed on to the
consumer in the form of a lower price. In a competitive market this should occur, but there is no certainty that the Court's analysis in this regard was consistent with the reality of the specific market it was
addressing.
93 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Law Applicable to
Contractual Obligations (Rome I), at amend. 14, COM ((2005) 0650 - C6-0441/2005/0261) (Aug. 28,
2007). One report quotes the Rapporteurs as stating:
With [. . .] reference to consumer contracts, recourse to the courts must be regarded as the last
resort. Legal proceedings, especially where foreign law has to be applied, are expensive and
slow. The introduction of a mechanism to deal with small claims in cross-border cases is a step
forward. However, the protection afforded to consumers by conflict-of-laws provisions is
largely illusory in view of the small value of most consumer claims and the cost and time consumed by bringing court proceedings. It is therefore considered that, particularly as regards
electronic commerce, the conflicts rule should be backed up by easier and more widespread
availability of appropriate online alternative dispute resolution (ADR) systems.
Giorgio Buono, Rome I: EP Rapporteur's Compromise Amendments and Council's Working Text, CONfiucr oir LAWS.NET (Sept. 16, 2007), http://conflictoflaws.net/2007/rome-i-ep-rapporteurs-compromiseamendments-and-councils-working-text/. This statement was repeated in Final Compromise Amendments. Final Compromise Amendments, EUR. PARL. Doc. 9/36 (2007).
94 Supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
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At first glance, there is logic to each of these approaches. But neither of them
provides real party autonomy. Each is an exercise in governmental paternalism,
dictating a specific path without real consumer choice. The Rome I approach
leaves no room for a consumer who would prefer at the outset to receive a better
price as a trade-off for accepting clauses in a contract that may be considered at
the time of contract formation as unlikely to matter. If only one out of a thousand
consumers in a similar transaction ends up with a dispute with the merchant that
would result in litigation, then the U.S. approach results in a benefit to the 999
similarly situated consumers-each of which receives a lower price for the item
purchased and none of which develops a dispute with the merchant. Is it a fair
trade-off to make dispute resolution more difficult for one consumer in exchange
for providing some, perhaps marginal, reduction in price to 999 other consumers?
Or is it a fair(er) trade-off to make dispute resolution easier for one consumer in
exchange for a marginally higher price charged to 999 other consumers? Either
approach represents a policy choice that should be carefully considered by those
creating the law. What should be considered, however, is reality, not just theory.
The U.S. Supreme Court did purport to consider this policy choice in Carnival
Cruise Lines, with the majority of the Justices accepting the policy that would
benefit more consumers in some small way while placing the limited number of
consumers for whom a legal dispute results at a litigation disadvantage. 95 The
Brussels I and Rome I Regulations represent the opposite choice in the consideration of the same trade-off. Under the EU Regulations, prices may be marginally
higher for all consumers, but for those who end up with a dispute with a
merchant, dispute resolution should be both more economical and on more
favorable terms.
The problem with the EU approach is that, in most consumer transactions it is
likely that the amount in controversy is simply too small to justify litigation in
the first place (and certainly too small to justify the secondary litigation required
to enforce the initial judgment in the judgment debtor's home jurisdiction).
Thus, such private international law rules, which ostensibly protect consumers,
most likely result in no real benefit while bringing with them the corresponding
loss of the transaction stage possibility of lower prices and enhanced access to
goods and services.
B.

Considering the Alternatives in the Context of Cross-Border ODR

As noted earlier, 9 6 the UNCITRAL ODR negotiations presume that, for the
type of low-value high-volume online transactions being considered, access to
courts is of little practical value-and thus does not equate to access to justice.
Thus, there really is no one who benefits from a system that ensures them the

95 Supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
96 Supra note 65.

Volume 10, Issue I

Loyola University Chicago International Law Review

31

Party Autonomy and Access to Justice
ability to go to national courts. As the study by the European Parliament has
stated, any such benefits are "largely illusory." 9 7
It is not only the EU Parliament that has questioned this effect of the current
combination of private international law and consumer protection laws in the EU.
A Commission Staff Working Document on consumer protection noted the fragmentation of consumer protection laws within the EU, and the impact of Rome I
as a result:
The effects of the fragmentation are felt by business because of the conflict-of law rules, and in particular the Rome I Regulation ("Rome I"),
which obliges traders not to go below the level of protection afforded to
foreign consumers in their country.
As a result of the fragmentation and Rome I, a trader wishing to sell
cross-border into another Member State will have to incur legal and other
compliance costs to make sure that he is respecting the level of consumer
protection in the country of destination. These costs reduce the incentive
for businesses to sell cross-border, particularly to consumers in small
Member States. Such costs are eventually passed on to consumers in the
form of higher prices or, worse, businesses refuse to sell cross-border. In
both cases consumer welfare is below the optimum level. 98
This analysis mirrors that provided by Justice Blackmun in the Carnival
Cruise Lines case in the U.S. Supreme Court.99 But, while both legal systems
have acknowledged the problem, neither has yet provided rules that grant both a
lower price and product/services availability at the transaction stage and consistent protection of the consumer/buyer when a dispute arises. This is precisely the
opportunity available in the UNCITRAL Working Group I negotiations.
C.

Getting the Benefits of Both Systems

As noted above, the U.S. approach to party autonomy and consumer protection
in cross-border transactions weighs in favor of enforcing choice of forum and
choice of law provisions, even when those provisions are unilaterally dictated by
the stronger party in the relationship. The EU approach, on the other hand, assumes that all relationships in which there is a weaker party (especially consumer
contracts) will result in unconscionable conduct by the stronger party in dictating
both choice of forum and choice of law. The result in Europe is a tendency
towards complete prohibition of pre-dispute agreement on choice of forum.1 00
97 Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Proposal for Directive on Consumer
Rights Impact Assessment Report, at 8 (2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu-/consumers/rights/docs/
impact assessmentrepotnen.pdf.
98 Id.

99 Supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
100 It must be noted that, while the Brussels I Regulation effectively provides such a prohibition in the
context of choice of court, the New York Convention (to which all EU Member States are parties) does
not provide such a prohibition in the context of arbitration. The European Court of Justice has, however,
applied the European Consumer Protection Directive to support national prohibitions of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer contracts on a case-by-case basis. Supra Part Ill.B.5.
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The problem with a complete prohibition on pre-dispute agreements to a
choice of forum, and particularly a prohibition on pre-dispute agreement to arbitration at the conclusion of the ODR process being considered in UNCITRAL
Working Group III, is that, while it may protect consumers from having bad
dispute resolution mechanisms imposed on them, it also prevents consumers
from entering into agreements to go to good dispute resolution mechanisms. The
entire purpose of the UNCITRAL ODR project is to create a good dispute resolution mechanism. Moreover, it is to create a good dispute resolution mechanism
where none currently exists as a practical matter. If the same process results in
the application of rules that prevent parties, particularly consumers, from using
the system being created, it will be a failure.10
It is not enough to say that consumers should have an option to use the dispute
resolution system, while merchants should be bound to use it. That removes
none of the unpredictability and risk currently faced by merchants. The response
to that type of risk by merchants, particularly in Europe, has been either to raise
prices or to opt out of cross-border transactions altogether. 10 2 That does not help
consumers.
By creating a fair system, and at the same time making it self-contained so that
there can be no reference to national or regional rules that will prevent its effective use, UNCITRAL Working Group III can get the best of both the current U.S.
approach and the current EU approach while avoiding the disadvantages of either
of them. Such a system can reduce the risk of multiple-forum and multiple-law
litigation for merchants, thus enticing them to participate in cross-border online
commerce. At the same time, the result should be lower prices and greater product and service availability for all buyers, including consumers. It will also mean
that, when a dispute arises, the buyer/consumer is fully protected by having a
simple, efficient, effective, transparent, and fair system for the resolution of that
dispute-a system that can produce an enforceable, binding result. In other
words, where access to courts has not provided access to justice, the UNCITRAL
system can provide real access to justice.
It may be that unlimited respect for party autonomy runs the risk of the
stronger party to a transaction imposing unfair choice of forum requirements on
101 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
Europ.T.S. No. 5; 213 U.N.T.S. 221, art. 6. There is in consumer protection circles the belief that provisions such as Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) requires that certain
parties, particularly consumers, always have access to their own national courts, thus preventing use of
effective alternative dispute resolution. Id. Article 6 provides that, "[i]n the determination of his civil
rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law." Id. It is
both nonsensical and contradictory to begin an UNCITRAL project with the foundational assumption
that, for low-value high-volume online transactions, access to courts is not access to justice (which is the
basic assumption underlying the entire negotiations), and then to block any progress towards real justice
by inserting rules that require that certain parties (consumers in particular) always retain access to their
home courts. If provisions like Article 6 of the ECHR mean anything, they must mean that states should
provide access to real justice, even when that cannot be provided through traditional national judicial
mechanisms. Thus, there can be no justice if states maintain prohibitions on pre-dispute agreement to
arbitration or other alternative dispute mechanisms for disputes arising from low-value high-volune
transactions.
102 See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
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the weaker party. The logical response to this risk is not, however, to prohibit all
pre-dispute choice of forum agreements. A complete prohibition is the
equivalent of responding to the fact that some consumers get cheated when they
buy a used car by prohibiting all consumers from buying used cars. Such a rule
will prevent a consumer from being cheated by being a party to a bad used car
deal, but it will also prevent a consumer from making a good deal on a used car.
We should not be creating a good system for dispute resolution while denying the
class of persons who can most benefit from it the right to use it.
The possibility exists for giving all parties both predictability at the transaction
stage and an effective forum at the dispute settlement stage. This will remove the
risk of uncertainty created by the potential for multiple-forum and multiple-law
litigation for the merchant, and as a result should make products and services
both more available and lower priced for the consumer. Because most online
transactions are accomplished with up-front payment mechanisms, it will also
provide consumers/buyers with an effective remedy where none now exists at the
dispute settlement stage. It can only happen, however, if the issue of party autonomy is properly addressed and if the system can be designed to prevent the application of rules prohibiting binding pre-dispute choice of forum.
V. Concluding Thoughts - Guidelines for a Successful Conclusion in
Working Group III
The work undertaken by UNCITRAL Working Group III has the possibility of
significantly enhancing the benefits, availability, and safety of cross-border online transactions. If the project can result in the successful creation of a fair and
effective set of generic procedural rules, a fair and effective set of guidelines and
minimum requirements for online dispute resolution providers and neutrals, a
relevant and self-contained, set of substantive legal principles for resolving disputes, and an effective cross-border enforcement mechanism, it will make a major contribution to both international commerce and consumer protection.
The system to be created by Working Group III must be simple, efficient,
effective, transparent, and fair. Only a system that has these characteristics will
invite the trust of both merchants and purchasers (including consumers) to enter
into cross-border, low-value high-volume electronic transactions that otherwise
create risks that keep both sellers and buyers from engaging in such transactions.
The process of developing the system must recognize that both sellers and buyers
require assurance that their interests will be protected in order to generate the
proper level of trust in that system. If either sellers or buyers opt out of, or are
inadequately protected by, the system, then it simply will not work.
The following guidelines will help insure that the instruments to be created by
Working Group HI result in a simple, efficient, effective, transparent, and fair
ODR system:
1) The system must recognize that alternatives for efficient and effective
dispute resolution do not currently exist for cross-border, low-value
high-volume electronic transactions. This has already been accom34
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2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

plished but is not fully acknowledged when some insist on prohibitions on binding pre-dispute choice of forum agreements.
Simplicity and efficiency require as few exclusions from scope as possible. A system that begins with computer-based communication and
analysis will not easily allow determinations that require human discretion or the application of difficult definitions designed to distinguish between types of parties to a dispute.
Efficiency and effectiveness require that the system be self-contained
and avoid the need for reference to national rules of private international law. A uniform system that relies on the differences that exist
in national rules of private international law will create disparate results depending on the location of parties and the need to "locate" the
transaction. This would create difficulties that should not occur in the
system. Stated more simply, efficiency and effective-ness require that
the system avoid the trap of thinking that rules of private international
law can be used to protect consumers in cross-border, low-value highvolume electronic transactions.
Efficiency, effectiveness, and transparency require that the system encourage dispute resolution that not only results in a binding decision,
but provides an automatic method for the enforcement of that decision
(e.g., charge-back methods or automatic payment reversal).
Transparency and fairness require that a party to a cross-border, lowvalue high-volume electronic transaction receive clear notice of the
dispute resolution option and a separate opportunity to choose not to
engage in a transaction if that party decides to avoid the dispute resolution process that is offered
Fairness requires that the system be designed so that states may agree
that the system itself is simple, efficient, effective, and transparent.
Private international law rules that exist to protect weaker parties from
unfair procedures are not necessary when states agree at the outset that
the system of dispute resolution operates to provide adequate protection of the weaker party. Thus, the fairness of the system itself is the
ultimate test of the simplicity, efficiency, effectiveness, and transparency required to replace protective rules of private international
law. If states find the system to meet these tests, then the system itself
will replace the need for "protective" rules of private international
law, and will itself result in the type of consumer protection often
sought by such rules of national law. This is an instance where a
uniform system of law is much better than relying on national rules of
private international law or national rules of consumer protection.
Simplicity, efficiency, effectiveness, and transparency can only result
if there is a single, self-contained system, with as few opportunities for
divergence through national law as possible.
Simplicity requires that the substantive legal principles to be applied
in the ODR process provide a focused and limited set of claims that
may be brought and set out a focused and limited set of remedies that
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may be assessed. Existing ODR systems for online transactions have
demonstrated that the vast majority of disputes in low-value high-volume online transactions lend themselves to a small, discrete set of
claims and options for remedies. More complex issues (e.g., product
liability, personal injury, class actions, multiple party claims, etc.)
need not be a part of a successful ODR system.
In the fall of 2012, the UNCITRAL Working Group III negotiations have
reached a critical stage. The potential benefits of an effective cross-border ODR
system are denied by none. The path to their creation, however, is currently
blocked by those unable to see beyond existing national and regional laws described as accomplishing goals that, in the context of ODR at least, they serve to
frustrate. Working Group III has the opportunity to combine the best of the elements of U.S. and EU private international law and consumer protection. What
is required is a fresh approach to concerns created by recent technological developments. If the Working Group can get beyond theoretical ties to old rules created for past realities, and embrace new rules that provide positive practical
results in the new internet environment, it can make a very significant contribution to both international trade and consumer protection.
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